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There is a belief among some public finance economists – especially 
among its practitioners – that, if enacted, optimal tax policy prescriptions would 
be widely unpopular with the public. Therefore such policies are often regarded 
as politically infeasible though theoretically optimal.
1 Such conclusions are 
puzzling. After all optimal tax policy prescriptions are derived from the 
maximization of a social welfare function of individual utilities subject to a tax 
revenue constraint [see, for example, Ramsey (1927), Mirrlees (1971), Diamond 
and Mirrlees (1971), and McCaffery and Slemrod (2004)]. If individual utility is 
correctly specified and the social welfare function properly accounts for 
                                                 
1 See Hettich and Winer (1988) for an interesting study of the political economy 
of tax reform. In their approach, tax structures are determined by government 
officials that attempt to maximize support from selfish voters. Their approach is 
an alternative explanation of why optimal tax theory has not been that relevant in 
the real world. Another possible explanation is provided by high information 
requirements associated with optimal tax theory. See, for example, Martinez-
Vazquez and Rider (1996), who describe some of the practical difficulties of 
implementing optimal tax policy prescriptions and offer a revelation approach to 
overcome the information requirements.    2
distributional concerns then optimal tax policy prescriptions should be popular 
with the public rather than unpopular.
2   
One possible explanation for this paradox may be that individual utility is 
not correctly specified as depending exclusively on one’s own payoff. Rather 
people may care about their own payoff as well as the payoffs of others, i.e., 
people have social preferences. Outside the context of optimal tax theory, the 
existence of social preferences is well established [see, for example, Frohlich 
and Oppenheimer (1992), Ledyard (1995), Camerer (1997), Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002)]. Clearly the policy 
prescriptions of optimal tax theory may be quite different if people care not only 
about their own payoff but also the payoffs of others.
3 More specifically, if people 
care about the distributional consequences of taxation, then tax structures that 
are perceived to result in an unfair distribution of after-tax incomes will reduce 
individual utility relative to tax structures that better satisfy individual concerns for 
                                                 
2 Several authors have used survey data to uncover public preferences for tax 
structures, in particular, for redistribution through progressive taxation [e.g. Lewis 
(1978), Gemmell, Morrissey, and Pinar (2004), and the review in Sheffrin (1994)]. 
Other studies have used experiments to investigate preferences for different 
degrees of tax progressivity [e.g., Hite and Roberts (1991)]. McCaffery and Baron 
(2004) report experimental evidence that the nature of the tax system and the 
way it is framed or presented to participants affect views on progressive taxation. 
3 There is substantial evidence suggesting that social preferences influence 
behavior in a variety of environments: Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) in 
firm pricing policies; Bagnoli and McKee (1991) in public good experiments; and 
Gϋth, Schmittenberger and Tietz (1990) in ultimatum bargaining games. Yet, 
some evidence also suggests that fairness considerations may not be important 
in other environments [e.g., Roth, Parsnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir (1991) 
and Fehr and Schmidt (1999)]. 
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distributional equity.
4 That is, the loss in utility associated with an unfair 
distribution of incomes may be just as keenly felt as the conventional excess 
burdens of distortionary taxation.
5
The most direct evidence bearing on this issue comes from the path 
breaking work of Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) and Engelmann and Strobel 
(2004). Frohlich and Oppenheimer (F&O) use laboratory experiments to 
investigate which principle of distributive justice people choose absent 
knowledge of their position in the income distribution.
6 In other words, they ask 
subjects to express a preference for a principle of distributive justice among 
several stylized principles, such as the familiar maximin principle [Rawls (1971)], 
efficiency principle [Harsanyi (1953, 1955)], among others.
7 F&O find that most 
groups choose a mixed principle: they prefer to maximize average income as in 
Harsanyi constrained by an income floor for the worst-off individual as in Rawls. 
Although F&O do not directly address the choice of tax structure, their results can 
be interpreted to imply that people care about both the efficiency and 
distributional consequences of tax policy and not, as in conventional optimal tax 
                                                 
4 Economic models can describe rational behavior and incorporate documented 
individual preferences and emotions. For example, Hermalin and Isen (2000) 
include regret and guilt as utility reducing emotions. See also Ackert, Church, 
and Deaves (2003) who argue that emotion can enhance individual decision-
making in financial settings. 
5 Payment resistance (tax evasion) may also increase if tax systems are 
perceived to be unfair [Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) and Alm (1998)]. 
6 Several other later papers have studied the choice in societies with different 
income distribution systems behind the “veil of ignorance” [e.g. Johansson-
Stenman, Carlsson, and Daruvula (2002), and Carlsson, Gautam Gupta, and  
Johansson-Stenman (2002)].   
7 By efficiency, we mean maximizing the sum of individual payoffs. We are not 
referring here to Pareto efficiency. 
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theory, simply the size of their own after-tax payoff. Though very instructive, their 
experiments do not provide quantitative evidence on the nature of the trade offs 
among the potentially conflicting goals of maximizing one’s own payoff, 
maximizing the sum of individual payoffs, and maximizing the payoff of the worst 
off individual. In other words, people may express support for the principles of 
efficiency and equity in the abstract. However, they may have only a very limited 
willingness to pursue such goals if they come at the expense of a reduced own 
payoff. 
In a related paper, Engelmann and Strobel (E&S) shed light on the nature 
of the trade off between these potentially conflicting goals. They use one-shot, 
distribution experiments to compare the performance of several behavioral 
models, including theories reflecting social preferences. Consistent with F&O, 
E&S conclude that theories of inequality aversion have no additional explanatory 
power in their data beyond what can be explained by the mixed rule of efficiency 
and maximin. They also conclude that theories of inequality aversion perform 
poorly in cases where a distribution with less inequality is Pareto dominated by 
another distribution. 
In this paper we examine fairness motives as a possible explanation of the 
paradox of optimal tax theory. We build on Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of 
inequality aversion to test whether people are willing to choose a distribution with 
a smaller own payoff in order to achieve a more equitable distribution of after-tax 
payoffs. In the experiments reported in this paper, we present participants with a 
simple task. We randomly assign nine participants in each experimental session 
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with a payoff uniformly distributed between $10 and $50, in increments of $5. 
Then, the participants are asked to vote for either a uniform head tax or a 
progressive tax. The vote of the majority determines the tax structure and 
consequently the distribution of after-tax payoffs to the subjects. Our laboratory 
experiments, conducted with student subjects, elicit individually held social 
preferences for redistributive taxation. Our central finding is that some people are 
prepared to sacrifice their own income in order to reduce inequality in the 
distribution of after-tax payoffs, but this apparent demand for fairness decreases 
as the cost of reducing inequality increases.  
Our experiments differ from those of F&O and E&S in three critical 
aspects. First, in their canonical experiments participants do not know their 
ranking in the income distribution.
8 Although we also examine behavior with role 
uncertainty, in our canonical experiments participants know their position in the 
pre-tax distribution. This allows us to gauge whether and how much participants 
are willing to sacrifice in terms of a smaller after-tax payoff in order to reduce 
payoff inequality.  
Second, in E&S’s setting the median income subject is a dictator and only 
the payoffs to others are changed by the dictator’s preferred distribution; in 
particular the dictator’s own payoff is unaffected. In our view, a decision reflects a 
taste for fairness when the preferred outcome requires a sacrifice to the decision 
                                                 
8 Engelman and Strobel provide some evidence based on sessions in which the 
subjects know their position in the income distribution and are required to 
sacrifice in order to achieve greater equity and/or efficiency. However, these 
experiments are mentioned only in passing to test the robustness of results 
obtained from their canonical experiments with role uncertainty and the decision 
maker’s own payoff is unaffected by the choice of distribution. 
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maker in the form of a reduced after-tax payoff in order to achieve a more 
equitable distribution of payoffs. Experimentally, a taste for fairness is exhibited 
when one tax structure is preferred to another even though the individual’s payoff 
is reduced under the preferred tax structure. Third, we use majority rule as the 
social choice mechanism rather than a dictator as in E&S. Since majority rule is 
frequently used in democracies to make collective choices -- such as the 
redistribution of income -- we believe that it is important to examine individual 
preferences for distributional equity in an environment using this collective choice 
mechanism. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe a model 
that formalizes our notion of fairness. Section Three presents a summary of 
voting behavior, and Section Four discusses the statistical model and the results. 
Section Five offers some concluding comments. 
 
I. A Model of Social Preferences 
  As reviewed in the previous section, there is growing empirical evidence in 
support of social preferences, or more precisely, people are concerned with their 
own payoffs as well as the payoffs of others. Although theoretical work continues 
on the form of such social preferences, from our perspective, three recent 
models are particularly relevant in framing how people may vote for different tax 
structures. First, Charness and Rabin (2002) develop a model that combines 
social preferences, efficiency concerns, and reciprocity to predict behavior in 
economic experiments. In their two-person formulation, a player’s utility is the 
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weighted average of one’s own payoff and the other player’s payoff where the 
weight for the other player depends on payoff inequality and whether the other 
player has behaved unfairly. From their model, E&S abstract two principles, 
namely efficiency and maximin. Second, Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) argue that 
own payoff and relative standing can explain observed behavior in many 
economic games. In their formulation, however, players do not care about 
inequality among other players or efficiency. Finally, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
develop a model where own payoff and inequality aversion play key roles, 
however, their model does not incorporate a concern for efficiency. 
Consequently, as E&S discuss, the Fehr-Schmidt model may perform poorly in 
predicting choice when a more equal distribution is Pareto dominated by a less 
equal distribution. 
Several considerations are pertinent in choosing a theoretical framework 
to explain individual preferences among alternative tax structures. First, we are 
not concerned here with reciprocity because voting processes are often 
anonymous, which prevents participants from observing one another’s voting 
behavior and rules out the ability to punish unfair play. Second, the choice of tax 
structure may be affected not only by the presence of social preferences but also 
concerns about efficiency. Third, the possible existence of social preferences 
may take varied and complex forms. An approach that allows some people to be 
concerned with their own payoff, averse to income inequality, and concerned with 
efficiency is, we believe, sufficiently flexible to account for different possible 
voting behaviors. Fourth, people may be more apt to show social preferences in 
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“low cost” voting environments when their decisions tend to matter less, as 
compared to “high cost” private choice environments, with the latter being the 
context of the three models summarized above.
9  
Fehr and Schmidt’s model provides a basis for our examination of social 
preferences. In their model, a player’s utility is a linear sum of one’s own payoff 
and the losses from disadvantageous and advantageous inequality.
10 Our 
statistical model, described later in this paper, is an adaptation of the Fehr and 
Schmidt model that incorporates efficiency concerns. 
In Fehr and Schmidt’s model with n players, an individual’s utility depends 
on one’s own payoff and inequity aversion as follows: 
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In this model πi is the monetary payoff to player i; δ1 is a parameter measuring 
the degree of disadvantageous inequality aversion; and δ2 is a parameter 
measuring the degree of advantageous inequality aversion. The first term on the 
right-hand-side reflects player i’s concern for his own payoff. The next two terms 
reflect the loss in utility that i suffers from disadvantageous and advantageous 
inequality, respectively. We assume that δ1 > δ2; or, in words, i suffers more from 
disadvantageous than advantageous inequality. Following Fehr and Schmidt, we 
                                                 
9  Eichenberger and Oberholzer-Gee (1998) provide experimental evidence that 
is consistent with the argument that behavior is fairer in a political sphere 
because the observation of social norms is costless.  People are fairer in the 
political sphere where social norms can be observed through voting behavior, 
which is nearly costless to observe. 
10 Inequality is disadvantageous when a reference individual earns more than the 
person evaluating the outcome. Advantageous inequality arises when the 
reference individual makes less than the evaluator. 
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assume that a player’s inequity aversion is self-centered, so that he does not 
care about inequities among other players. Finally, we normalize the disutility 
from inequity aversion by n -1 in order to ensure that the effect of inequity 
aversion is independent of the number of players. As discussed below, this 
model of individual utility can be adapted to predict an individual’s vote between 




II. Experimental Design and Method 
The choice of tax structure in any country is a complex process, but 
ultimately it can be reduced to voters supporting different political platforms with 
tax proposals implying different degrees of redistribution and efficiency losses 
through various economic incentives. In our experimental setting individuals 
express a preference for distributional equity when voting for alternative tax 
structures, some of which involve efficiency losses to achieve a reduction in 
inequality.  
We began by conducting six experimental sessions, each consisting of a 
series of five trials.
12 Nine university students participated in each session, which 
                                                 
11 One feature of this model is the potentially high correlation among three terms, 
which are all functions of own payoff. We discuss the empirical implications of 
this correlation and possible remedies below. 
12 Since there may be learning in this repetition, our analysis below controls for 
session fixed effects. However, note that repeated game effects, such as 
“cooperative” choices, are not of concern because the nine participants in each 
of our experimental sessions vote anonymously.  
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were completed in approximately 30 minutes.
13 The average age of participants 
was 22.0 years, and no participant took part in more than one session.
14 After 
they arrived for the experiment, participants received a set of instructions and 
followed along as an experimenter read aloud. The instructions are included in 
the Appendix. The experimental design is summarized in Table I and described 
below. 
  In all sessions, participants are endowed with an income or pre-tax payoff 
that is theirs to keep for participating in the study except that they pay a tax. Each 
participant’s income is determined by drawing a card from a set of nine cards. 
The following incomes are recorded on the cards: $10, $15, $20, $25, $30, $35, 
$40, $45 and $50. They are also reminded that because each income is equally 
likely, the average pre-tax payoff across participants is $30.
15  
  In all treatments the tax is one of two types. As Table 2 reports, Tax 1 is a 
lump-sum head tax of $7.50 and Tax 2 is a progressive income tax. Notice from 
                                                 
13 In order to establish a consistent pre-tax payoff distribution across the nine 
sessions, it was necessary to choose a fixed number of participants for each 
session. We eliminate the possibility of a split majority or 50-50 vote by requiring 
an odd number of subjects. We settled on nine participants in order to provide 
anonymity among the participants on the one hand and to limit the total cost of 
the experiments on the other. 
14 Some critics question the relevance of insight provided by experiments with 
student subject pools.  If the average person behaves differently from university 
students, we should be cautious in drawing inferences about the general 
population.  However, the evidence suggests that the behavior of subjects draw 
from other populations is not markedly different from the behavior of student 
subjects [Davis and Holt (1993, page 17)]. 
15 Of course, people may behave differently when their income is earned rather 
than endowed. In particular, people may be more predisposed to fairness when 
endowed.  Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994) provide experimental 
evidence that first movers in dictator and ultimatum games offer less when the 
first mover is decided by the higher score on a general knowledge test. 
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Panel A of Table 2 that the tax regimes are revenue neutral in Treatments 1 and 
2.
16 The sum of after-tax payoffs is $202.50 for both the head and progressive 
taxes. For Treatments 1 and 2, four of the nine participants receive a higher 
after-tax payoff under the head tax, as noted in Table 1. Four (4) low-income 
participants receive a higher after-tax payoff under the progressive tax; whereas, 
the median participant with a pre-tax payoff of $30 receives the same after-tax 
payoff under both tax structures.
17 If the participants care only about their after-
tax payoff, high-income participants (i.e., pre-tax payoff > $30) prefer the head 
tax; low-income participants (i.e., pre-tax payoff < $30) prefer the progressive tax; 
and the median income participant (i.e., pre-tax payoff = $30) is indifferent. 
The after-tax payoff of the subjects is determined by majority vote in the 
choice between the head tax (Tax 1) and the progressive tax (Tax 2).
18 
Participants are given 5 minutes to indicate the preferred tax. After the votes are 
tallied, the chosen tax structure is publicly announced and participants are 
reminded that their after-tax payoff is private information that should not be 
disclosed at any time.  
                                                 
16 In Treatments 3 and 4, we simulate the excess burden of progressive taxation 
by using two tax regimes that are not revenue neutral, as discussed below. 
17 During the experiments, we used the more neutral terms Tax 1 and Tax 2 
rather than lump-sum tax and progressive tax to refer to the two tax regimes in 
order to avoid unintentionally biasing the responses. 
18 Clearly, we are concerned in this paper with outcome fairness. There is a 
related literature that examines process fairness. By using majority voting to 
decide the outcome, we have invoked a process, which we believe to be widely 
accepted as process fair. However, it would be interesting in future research to 
examine the sensitivity of the results reported here to alternative decision rules 
such as super majority or weighted voting schemes. 
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These procedures are repeated five times in each session. As the 
instructions indicate, participants are told at the outset that they would be paid 
based on the results of only one of the trials, and this trial would be chosen by a 
card draw at random by one of the participants from a set of cards labeled 1-5. 
Since ex ante the students have no way of knowing which trial is the payout trial, 
it is in their interest to treat all trials with equal seriousness.
19
Treatments 1 and 2 differ in that participants in Treatment 1 vote for a tax 
structure before they drew an income card. In other words, participants in 
Treatment 1 vote before they know their pre-tax payoff. Since they do not know 
their place in the income distribution when they vote, they have no way of 
knowing whether the chosen tax regime increases or decreases their after-tax 
payoff, and, in that sense, they vote ‘as if behind a veil of ignorance,’ to use a 
phrase coined by Rawls (1971). In Treatment 2 participants vote after drawing an 
income card; so they know their standing in the income distribution when they 
vote. These two treatments allow us to see if knowledge of one’s position in the 
income distribution, and thus the effect of the vote on their own after-tax payoff, 
changes the outcome of the vote.  
At the conclusion of each session, participants complete a post-
experiment questionnaire, designed to collect demographic information. 
Consideration of demographic information does not indicate any notable 
differences between participants across all sessions (1-10), as expected given 
that all subjects are recruited from the same pool. In addition, their responses on 
                                                 
19 As discussed in greater detail, we estimate a variant of our model in which we 
control for round effects. We do not find any evidence of a round effect. 
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the questionnaire indicate that they found the experiment interesting and the 
monetary incentives motivating. Participants respond on an eleven-point scale as 
to how interesting they found the experiment, where 1 = not very interesting and 
11 = very interesting. The mean response for Treatments 1 and 2 is 9.22.  
Participants also respond on an 11-point scale as to how they would characterize 
the amount of money earned for taking part in the experiment, where 1 = nominal 
amount and 11 = considerable amount. The mean response across Treatments 1 
and 2 is 9.0.  
 
III. Summary of Voting Behavior 
A. Revenue Neutral Treatments 
Table 3 summarizes the preferences of participants as revealed by their 
voting behavior. In Treatment 1, the majority vote for Tax 2 (the progressive tax) 
in 11 of 15 trials. In these sessions, participants do not know their income level 
when they cast their votes, and the majority chose the progressive tax. This 
result supports the view that people care about the distributional consequences 
of taxation and not simply their own payoff. Since the participants do not know 
their pre-tax payoff, however, a majority voting for the progressive tax may reflect 
risk aversion. In fact, the Rawls maximin criterion is often criticized on the 
grounds that it assumes a greater degree of individual risk aversion than indeed 
may be the case.  
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In order to control for this source of risk, we allow participants to observe 
their pre-tax payoff before voting.
20 This experimental design also allows us to 
observe whether participants are willing to sacrifice income in order to satisfy a 
taste for fairness, if in fact a taste for fairness drove the previous finding. In 
Treatment 2, the majority votes for the progressive tax (Tax 2) in 10 of 15 trials. 
As we will see, it is not necessarily the median participant with a pre-tax payoff of 
$30 who is decisive. Thus, some participants vote for the progressive tax even 
though they suffer in terms of their own after-tax payoff. Alternatively, some 
median income participants vote against the progressive tax even though their 
after-tax payoff is unaffected by their choice of distribution. In other words, it 
appears that some participants are prepared to pay or sacrifice income in order 
to satisfy a taste for fairness. This evidence of heterogeneity in the population 
may play an important role in distribution experiments and may help explain the 
conclusion of E&S that theories of inequality aversion do not provide additional 
explanatory power not provided by the efficiency and maximin principles. 
Table 4 provides additional insight into the behavior of our experimental 
participants. As one might expect, in Treatment 1 where the participants vote 
‘behind a veil of ignorance,’ voting for either Tax 1 or Tax 2 shows no pattern 
across payoffs. Interestingly, however, we observe approximately the same 
proportion of total votes for the progressive tax (Tax 2) in Treatment 2 (59/135 = 
                                                 
20 In a strict sense, removing the “veil of ignorance” only removes the uncertainty 
regarding one’s income. Uncertainty remains as to how others will vote, and we 
cannot rule out rule an effect of this type of uncertainty on voting. But, note that 
uncertainty regarding how others will vote is equally present behind the “veil of 
ignorance.”  
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0.44), in which pre-tax payoffs are known before voting as when they are not, as 
in Treatment 1 (54/135 = 0.40). In Treatment 2, we observe a clear pattern in 
voting behavior with low (high) payoff individuals showing a strong preference for 
the progressive tax (head tax). It is impossible to infer whether low payoff 
individuals are voting for the progressive tax out of concern for their own payoff 
and/or due to disadvantageous inequality aversion because the two motives are 
congruent. However, we also see that the median-income participant whose pre-
tax payoff is $30 votes only slightly more often for Tax 2 (8/15 = 0.53). 
Significantly in terms of our hypothesis, some individuals vote for the 
progressive tax (Tax 2) even when it is clearly not in their monetary self-interest 
to do so. In fact, we observe more votes for Tax 2 by high-income participants 
(15.0% or 9/60 votes) as compared to votes for Tax 1 (head tax) by low-income 
participants (1.6% or 1/60 votes). 
To provide further insight into voting behavior, we report voting by income 
in Table 4. In Treatment 2 (pre-tax income is known before voting), nine out of a 
possible 60 votes cast were for the progressive tax, even though the participants 
know before casting a vote that their pre-tax payoff is greater than the median, 
and therefore they would be sacrificing income by voting for the progressive tax 
(Tax 2). Four (4) participants cast these nine votes. Two of these subjects 
participated in session 4, and one each in sessions 5 and 6.  We refer to these 
subjects as fairness preferring. Three of the four always voted for the progressive 
tax (Tax 2), regardless of their income level.  
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Demographic information for Treatment 2 indicates the following. Our 
median participants are in their third year of university study. Two fairness-
preferring participants are in their first year at the university, and the other two 
are in their third year. Two fairness-preferring participants are men, and two are 
women. Three of the four report that their household income is less than 
$25,000, and one reports income in the range of $25,001-$50,000. The median 
participant in sessions 4-6 reports income in the $25,001 to $50,000 range. 
Because three of four fairness-preferring participants report income less than the 
median, there is some evidence that our fairness-preferring subjects are, on 
average, lower income.  
Overall the results support the hypothesis that some subjects exhibit 
social preferences and are prepared to pay for more equitable outcomes, even if 
it is personally costly to do so.  
 
B. Treatments with a Distortionary Progressive Tax 
Because previous experimental evidence suggests that some people care 
about efficiency or maximizing the sum of payoffs, we conduct two additional 
treatments.
21 In Treatments 3 and 4, we require participants to choose between 
two tax regimes that are not revenue neutral. In other words, the sum of the after-
                                                 
21 As in Treatments 1 and 2, participants completed a post-experiment 
questionnaire at the conclusion of each session. Participants responded on an 
eleven-point scale as to how interesting they found the experiment, where 1 = not 
very interesting and 11 = very interesting and the mean response for Treatments 
3 and 4 is 8.94.  Participants also responded on an 11-point scale as to how they 
would characterize the amount of money earned for taking part in the 
experiment, where 1 = nominal amount and 11 = considerable amount and the 
mean response across Treatments 3 and 4 is 9.08.  
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tax payoffs from the “distortionary” progressive tax is less than that of the lump-
sum head tax. Notice from Panel B of Table 2 that in Treatment 3, the sum of the 
after-tax payoffs with the head tax is $247.50; whereas the sum of the after-tax 
payoff with the progressive tax is $202.50.  With the exception of the two lowest 
pre-tax payoff participants ($10 and $15), all the subjects have an economic 
incentive – absent inequality aversion - to vote for the head tax (Tax 1). Turning 
to Treatment 4, the after-tax payoffs are summarized in Panel C of Table 2. 
Again, the tax regimes are not revenue neutral. The sum of after-tax payoffs with 
the lump-sum head tax is $225.00; whereas the sum of after-tax payoffs with the 
distortionary progressive tax is $202.50. Now, five of nine participants have an 
economic incentive – again absent inequality aversion – to vote for the head tax 
(Tax 1). In short, the tax regimes in Treatments 3 and 4 are not revenue neutral; 
otherwise the procedures are identical to those described above for Treatment 2. 
As before, nine university students participated in each session; the participants 
knew their pre-tax payoff before they voted; and the majority vote determined the 
after-tax payoffs. Finally, these procedures were repeated five times in each 
session. 
Table 3 reports the voting behavior of the majority in Treatments 3 and 4. 
In contrast to the behavior observed in Treatment 2, the majority of participants 
vote against the progressive tax. In Treatment 3, the majority votes for the lump-
sum head tax in every trial. In Treatment 4, the majority votes for the lump-sum 
head tax in eight of ten trials. In other words, when the tax is not revenue neutral, 
fewer people are willing to sacrifice to reduce the dispersion in after-tax payoffs. 
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This result is suggestive: Individuals care about distributional equity, but they 
also care about the total size of the pie being divided.
22
Votes by income level, reported in Table 4, also support this interpretation. 
Few people with high incomes (i.e., pre-tax payoff > $30) vote for the progressive 
tax. In Treatment 3, all participants with incomes greater than or equal to $20 
have an economic incentive – absent distributional considerations - to vote for 
the head tax (Tax 1). We observe only 2.9% (2/70 votes) of high-income votes 
for the progressive tax (Tax 2) in Treatment 3. Similarly, in Treatment 4 only 4% 
(2/50) of high-income voters (pre-tax payoff ≥ $30) choose the progressive tax 
(Tax 2). 
 
IV. Statistical Model and Results 
The foregoing discussion provides a number of interesting insights into the 
observed voting patterns. Generally speaking, the results are consistent with the 
predictions of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequality aversion. In order to submit 
the model to a more rigorous test, we use the data generated by our experiments 
to estimate an empirical analog of the Fehr-Schmidt model, which predicts voting 
behavior in our experimental environment.  










∆ + ∆ + + + =
j i
i j i i n





0 π π π α
*
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22 We observe that as the excess burden of the distortionary progressive tax 
increases, the number of people voting for the progressive tax (Tax 2) 
decreases. This suggests that there may be a downward sloping demand for 
fairness. This is an interesting issue for further study. 
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In this model, yi
* is a latent-continuous-random-variable representing the change 
in utility due to the progressive tax (Tax 2) versus the head tax (Tax 1). The 
change in utility of a particular choice cannot be observed, but we can observe 
the individual’s vote. In a binary choice, voting is incentive compatible. We 
assume that the individual votes in favor of the tax structure that maximizes own 
















In other words, yi
* takes the value of 1 when a subject prefers the progressive 
tax; and 0 otherwise.  
Since E&S report evidence that the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequality 
aversion performs poorly when distributions are Pareto dominated, we include a 
dummy variable D, which takes the value of 1 for Treatments 3 and 4, which are 
not revenue neutral. This allows us to account for efficiency concerns. We also 
assume that i’s utility depends on the difference in one’s own payoff and 
differences in the indices of disadvantageous and advantageous inequality, as 
defined in Section I above. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
among the subjects, we include αi
*, which is a latent random variable that reflects 
unobserved idiosyncratic tastes for fairness. Finally, the random error of the 
structural model is given by εi.  
  Since the value of the regressors for each observation depends on pre-tax 
income, which was randomly assigned by drawing a card, we feel confident that 
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αi
* is statistically independent of the other regressors in the model. We also 
include a constant in the regression; therefore, αi
* is the deviation from a 
common mean. Lacking any information about the distribution of αi
*, it seems 
reasonable to assume that deviations from a common mean are normally 
distributed in the student population from which we drew our sample. 




*], where dii 
and aii are the indices of disadvantageous and advantageous inequality, 
respectively. By further assuming εi has a standard normal distribution, it follows 
that our specification is a multivariate probit model.
23 Therefore, we estimate our 
empirical model using random effects probit. Our results are very similar to those 
reported subsequently when we estimate random-effects or fixed-effects, linear 
probability or logit models. In contrast to E&S’s one shot design, our 
experimental design allows us to control for individual effects. Charness and 
Rabin (2002) report evidence that individual effects may be important in 
experiments designed to elicit tastes for distributional equity. 
Our experimental design elicits repeated binary choices by 63 subjects. 
The resulting data include 315 votes for treatments 2, 3, and 4.
24 The regression 
                                                 
23 The assumption of unit variance is an innocent normalization [see, for 
example, Greene (2002)]. Also, Hsiao (2003) provides an excellent discussion of 
discrete choice as well as fixed and random effects models. 
24 We exclude treatment 1 because pre-tax payoffs are unknown before voting 
and we need a reference payoff in order calculate the regressors. Furthermore, 
the regressors would be identical for any choice of reference income. For 
example, the expected payoff is an obvious candidate to serve as the reference 
income; but, in this case the regressors would be identical for every observation.
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results are reported in Table 5 for two specifications of the model.
25 The table 
reports estimated coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses and the 
corresponding marginal effects in brackets. The first specification (column 1) is a 
model of purely selfish preferences, in which voting behavior is determined only 
by the difference in one’s own payoff. The second specification (column 2) 
includes measures of the difference in disadvantageous and advantageous 
inequality.
26 Recall that the estimated coefficients of a probit equation indicate 
the direction of change due to a vote for the head tax (Tax 1); whereas the 
marginal effects show the change in the probability of a vote for the head tax for 
each independent variable. Finally, the table reports goodness of fit measures, 
including Wald’s χ
2 test statistic for the significance of the regression, the 




                                                 
25 For the random-effects model, the likelihood (for an independent unit i) is 
expressed as an integral, which is computed in STATA using Gauss-Hermite 
quadrature. STATA recommends that the fitted model be evaluated for sensitivity 
to the chosen number of quadrature points. As a rule of thumb, if the coefficients 
do not change by more than a relative difference of 0.01 percent, then the choice 
of quadrature points does not significantly affect the outcome and the results may 
be confidently interpreted. When we change the number of quadrature points by 
± 4 points, our estimates do not change by more than the indicated 0.01 percent. 
26 In order to test for learning or order effects, we constructed a variable that 
ranged from 1 to 5 depending on the round of the experiment. This variable was 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. More importantly, including this 
variable in the regression does not change the results reported below. 
27 Like a conventional R
2 in the context of ordinary least squares, McFaden’s 
Pseudo-R
2 increases as the number of regressors in the model increases. 
Accordingly, we adjust the likelihood ratio index by subtracting K, the number of 
regressors in the model, from the numerator of the index. Therefore, McFadden’s 
likelihood ratio index must increase by more than 1 for each added regressor in 
order for the adjusted measure reported here to increase in value. See 
McFadden (1984) and note no. 4 of Table 5 for further details. 
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The estimated coefficients of both models have the expected signs and 
are statistically significant at conventional levels, except for the dummy variable 
for a distortionary progressive tax, which is statistically insignificant.
28 In the 
purely selfish model, a subject with greater change in own payoff is more likely to 
vote for the head tax and subjects in the treatments in which the progressive tax 
is distortionary are also more likely to vote for the head tax. As predicted by Fehr 
and Schmidt’s model of social preferences, however, subjects dislike inequality 
as evidenced by the negative and statistically significant estimates of the 
coefficients of the change in the indices of disadvantageous and advantageous 
inequality in the social preferences model. We also perform a likelihood ratio test 
of the linear restriction that social preferences do not belong in the model (HO: B3 
= B4 = 0). This test rejects the null hypothesis (χ
2 = 13.24, p < 0.01) at 
conventional levels of significance. Interestingly, the estimated coefficients in the 
social preferences specification are consistent with earlier experimental evidence 
suggesting that individuals are more concerned with disadvantageous inequality 
(coefficient = -0.6915) than advantageous inequality (coefficient = -0.5031).  
One drawback of the Fehr-Schmidt model is that the regressors are 
potentially collinear. In fact, the covariances are substantial, ranging from -0.831 
                                                 
28 Since others have argued that whether and how social preferences are 
exhibited depends importantly on the economic environment, we report the 
results including the dummy variable to control for differences in the economic 
environment among treatments. We also estimated both specifications of the 
model without the dummy variable. We obtain the same qualitative results. 
Specifically, the estimated coefficient on the change in one’s own payoff is 
positive and statistically significant in both models, and the estimates on the 
changes in the two indices of inequality aversion are negative and statistically 
significant in the social preferences specification.  
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in the case of the covariance between the differences in own payoff and the 
indices of disadvantageous inequality and -0.931 for the covariance of the 
differences in the indices of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. The 
case of high correlation among the variables is not one of identification as in the 
case of perfect collinearity. In fact, estimates are consistent in the presence of 
near multicollinearity [Greene (2002)]. Rather the problem is precision; the higher 
the correlation between the regressors becomes, the less precise our estimates 
will be. In other words, our reported t-statistics are biased downward, and we are 
more likely to accept the null hypothesis though it is false. Since we reject the 
null hypothesis that the slope coefficients are equal to zero, the high collinearity 
among the regressors does not appear to be problematic. However, we 
experimented with alternative specifications of the model, by squaring the terms 
of the indices of inequality before summing them, in order to reduce the high 
degree of collinearity among the regressors. This transformation of the data 
substantially reduces the covariances and, as expected, the estimates are more 
precise. In summary, our evidence supports the model of social preferences. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This paper reports the results of simple experiments designed to examine 
individual preferences regarding tax structures. The literature suggests that an 
optimal tax minimizes the excess burden of taxation subject to a revenue 
constraint. For example, lump-sum taxes are thought by some to be an ideal 
form of taxation because they do not change relative prices and, therefore, do 
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not induce excess burdens. Historically, however, lump-sum taxes are 
infrequently used in practice and are often greeted with strong public opposition 
when they are employed. We believe that for a given tax revenue yield, a lump-
sum tax may not be optimal because people care about the fairness of tax 
structures as well as their total burden.   
The results of our experiments are consistent with this conjecture. When 
given the choice between a lump-sum head tax and a lump-sum progressive tax, 
the majority of participants choose a progressive tax, even when participants 
know their pre-tax payoff before voting. Informal conversations with participants 
subsequent to the experimental sessions suggest that fairness was a 
consideration. However, when the tax is not revenue neutral through the 
internalization of sizable excess burdens, the majority voted for a lump-sum head 
tax. Thus, when the group’s total after-tax payoff had to be sacrificed to reduce 
inequality among payoffs, fewer were willing to pay for fairness. 
Standard economic models, including those of optimal taxation, must be 
consistent with the full range of human motives if they are to provide reasonable 
guides to policy design. Our evidence suggests that at least some people value 
fairness and that models that exclude this concern may not adequately 
characterize preferred outcomes.  Further investigation of the impact of social 
preferences on decision making in groups will provide important insight for 
economic policy, including, but not limited to, the optimal tax structure. 
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TABLE 1⎯EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
Treatment Sessions 









1  1-3  Before  $7.50  4 out of 9 
2  4-6  After  $7.50  4 out of 9 
3  7-8  After  $2.50  7 out of 9 
4  9-10  After  $5.00  5 out of 9 
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TABLE 2⎯TAX STRUCTURES 
  
Panel A: Treatments 1 and 2 (Sessions 1-6) 
Tax 1: Head tax  Tax 2: Progressive tax  Pre-Tax 
Income  Tax After-tax  payoff Tax After-tax  payoff 
$10.00 $7.50  $2.50  $0  $10.00 
$15.00  $7.50 $7.50 $2.00  $13.00 
$20.00 $7.50 $12.50 $3.00 $17.00 
$25.00 $7.50 $17.50 $4.00 $21.00 
$30.00 $7.50 $22.50 $7.50 $22.50 
$35.00  $7.50  $27.50 $11.00 $24.00 
$40.00  $7.50  $32.50 $12.00 $28.00 
$45.00  $7.50  $37.50 $13.00 $32.00 
$50.00  $7.50  $42.50 $15.00 $35.00 
Total  $67.50 $202.50 $67.50 $202.50 
 
Panel B: Treatment 3 (Sessions 7-8) 
Tax 1:Head tax  Tax 2: Progressive tax  Pre-Tax 
Income  Tax After-tax  payoff Tax After-tax  payoff 
$10.00  $2.50 $7.50  $0  $10.00 
$15.00  $2.50 $12.50 $2.00 $13.00 
$20.00  $2.50 $17.50 $3.00 $17.00 
$25.00  $2.50 $22.50 $4.00 $21.00 
$30.00  $2.50 $27.50 $7.50 $22.50 
$35.00  $2.50  $32.50 $11.00 $24.00 
$40.00  $2.50  $37.50 $12.00 $28.00 
$45.00  $2.50  $42.50 $13.00 $32.00 
$50.00  $2.50  $47.50 $15.00 $35.00 
Total  $22.50 $247.50 $67.50 $202.50 
 
Panel C: Treatment 4 (Sessions 9-10) 
Tax 1: Head tax  Tax 2: Progressive tax  Pre-Tax 
Income  Tax After-tax  payoff Tax After-tax  payoff 
$10.00  $5.00 $5.00  $0  $10.00 
$15.00  $5.00 $10.00 $2.00 $13.00 
$20.00  $5.00 $15.00 $3.00 $17.00 
$25.00  $5.00 $20.00 $4.00 $21.00 
$30.00  $5.00 $25.00 $7.50 $22.50 
$35.00  $5.00  $30.00 $11.00 $24.00 
$40.00  $5.00  $35.00 $12.00 $28.00 
$45.00  $5.00  $40.00 $13.00 $32.00 
$50.00  $5.00  $45.00 $15.00 $35.00 
Total  $45.00 $225.00 $67.50 $202.50 
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TABLE 3 ⎯ MAJORITY VOTING 
 
Number of sessions with 
majority vote for 
Treatment Sessions 









of votes for 
Tax 1 
1 1-3  4  11  0.64 0.36 
2 4-6  5  10  0.56 0.44 
3 7-8  10  0  0.81 0.81 
4 9-10  8  2  0.54  0.54 
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TABLE 4⎯VOTING BY INCOME 
 
Treatment 1  Treatment 2  Treatment 3  Treatment 4 
Sessions 1-3  Sessions 4-6  Sessions 7-8  Sessions 9-10 
 
Income 
Tax 1  Tax 2  Tax 1  Tax 2  Tax 1  Tax 2  Tax 1  Tax 2 
10  9 6 1  14  2 8 0  10 
15 4 11 0 15 3  7  0 10 
20  6 9 0  15  9 1 0  10 
25 7  8  0 15  10 0  2  8 
30 4 11 7  8 10 0  9  1 
35 7  8 13 2 10 0 10 0 
40 2 13  13 2 10 0 10 0 
45  7 8  11  4 9 1 9 1 
50 8  7 14 1 10 0 10 0 
Total  54 81 59 76 73 17 50 40 
Note: Tax 1 is a head tax; Tax 2 is a progressive tax. 
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TABLE 5⎯ PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF VOTING 
 















Dummy for distortionary progressive tax 
















2 test of the significance of the regression  41.33*** 36.26*** 
Estimated value of the log-likelihood function  -93.42  -86.75 
McFadden’s Adjusted Pseudo-R
2 0.5426 0.5602 
Notes:  
1. In the upper panel, estimated coefficients are reported at the top of each cell; below which t-
statistics for the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses ( ); and below that the 
corresponding marginal effects are reported in brackets [ ]. 
2. Although we do not report t-statistics for the marginal effects, there is no change in significance 
for any of the variables. 
3. A single asterisk (*) indicates that the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level, a double 
asterisk (**) indicates significance at the 5-percent level, and a triple asterisk (***) indicates 
significance at the 1-percent level. 
4. McFadden’s Adjusted Pseudo-R












; where ln[L0] is the maximized value of the 
log-likelihood function computed with only a constant term;  [ ] L ˆ ln  is the maximized value of the 
log-likelihood function for the model, and K is the number of regressors. We subtract K from the 
numerator of the likelihood ratio index (LRI) to account for changes in the LRI due to the changes 
in the number of regressors in the models (see footnote 26 for further details). 
 
   
 
   30
Acknowledgements: The views expressed here are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve 
System.  The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta and the International Studies Program of Georgia State 
University. The authors thank Budina Naydenova for research assistance and 
Francisco Arze, Ann Gillette, Bryan Church, Govind Hariharan, Luc Noiset, and 
Roy Wada for helpful discussions and comments.
   
 
   31
REFERENCES 
Ackert, Lucy F., Church, Bryan K., Deaves, Richard, 2003. Emotion and financial 
markets. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, Second 
Quarter, 33-41. 
 
Alm, James, 1998. Tax compliance and administration. In: Hildreth, W. Bartley, 
Richardson, James A. (Eds.), Handbook on Taxation, Marcel Dekker, Inc., 
New York, pp. 741-768. 
 
Andreoni, James, Erard, Brian, Feinstein, Jonathan, 1998. Tax compliance. 
Journal of Economic Literature 36(2), 818-60. 
 
Bagnoli, Mark, McKee, Michael, 1991. Voluntary contribution games: efficient 
provision of public goods. Economic Inquiry 29(2), 351-66. 
 
Bolton, Gary E., Ockenfels, Axel, 2000. ERC: a theory of equity, reciprocity, and 
competition. The American Economic Review 90(1), 166-93. 
 
Camerer, Colin F., 1997. Progress in behavioral game theory. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 11(4). 167-88. 
 
Carlsson, Fredrik, Gautam Gupta, Olof Johansson-Stenman, 2002. Choosing 
from behind a veil of ignorance in India.  Working Papers in Economics 
No. 72, Department of Economics, Goteborg University.  
 
Charness, Gary, Rabin, Matthew, 2002. Understanding social preferences with 
simple tests. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(3), 817-69. 
 
Davis, Douglas D., Holt, Charles A., 1993. Experimental Economics, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
 
Diamond, Peter A., Mirrlees, James A, 1971. Optimal taxation and public 
production: I – production efficiency. The American Economic Review 
61(1), 8-27. 
 
Eichenberger, Reiner, Oberholzer-Gee, Felix, 1998. Rational moralists: the role 
of fairness in democratic economic politics. Public Choice 94(1-2), 191-
210. 
 
Engelmann, Dirk, Strobel, Martin, 2004. Inequality aversion, efficiency, and 
maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments. The American 
Economic Review 94 (4), 857-69. 
 
Fehr, Ernst, Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. A theory of fairness, competition, and 
cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3), 817-68. 
   
 
   32
 
Frohlich, Norman, Oppenheimer, Joe A., 1992.  Choosing Justice: An 
Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory. University of California Press, 
Berkeley. 
 
Gemmell, Norman, Morrisey, Oliver, Pinar, Abuzer, 2004. Tax perceptions and 
preferences over tax structure in the United Kingdom. The Economic 
Journal 114, 117-38. 
 
Greene, William H., 2002. Econometric Analysis. Fifth Edition, Prentice-Hall, New 
York.  
 
Gϋth, Werner; Schmittenberger, Rolf, Tietz, Reinhard, 1990. Ultimatum 
bargaining behavior – a survey and comparison of experimental results. 
Journal of Economic Psychology 11(3), 417-49. 
 
Harsanyi, John, 1953. Cardinal Utility and the Theory of Risk-Taking. The Journal 
of Political Economy 61, 434-35. 
 
Harsanyi, John, 1955. Cardinal Utility, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility in Welfare Economics.” The Journal of Political 
Economy 63, 302-21. 
 
Hermalin, Benjamin, Isen, Alice M., 2000. The effect of affect on economic and 
strategic decision making. Working paper, Johnson Graduate School of 
Management, Cornell University. 
 
Hettich, Walter, Winer, Stanley L., 1988. Economic and political foundations of 
tax structure. The American Economic Review 78(4), 701-12. 
 
Hite, P.A., Roberts, M.L., 1991. An experimental investigation of taxpayer 
judgments on rate structure in the individual income tax system. Journal of 
the American Taxation Association 13, 47-63.  
 
Hoffman, Elizabeth, McCabe, Kevin, Shachat, Keith, Smith, Vernon, 1994. 
Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games. Games 
and Economic Behavior 7(3), 346-380. 
 
Hsiao, Cheng, 2003. Analysis of Panel Data. Second Edition, Cambridge 
University Press, New York. 
 
Johansson-Stenman, Olof, Carlsson, Fredrik, and Daruvula, D., 2002. Measuring 
future grandparents’ preferences for equality and relative standing. 
Economic Journal 112, 362-83.  
 
   
 
   33
Kahneman, Daniel, Knetsch, Jack L., Thaler, Richard, 1986. Fairness as a 
constraint on profit seeking: entitlements in the market. The American 
Economic Review, September 76(4), 728-41. 
 
Ledyard, John, 1995, Public goods experiments. In: Kagel, John H., Roth, Alvin 
E. (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, pp. 111-94. 
 
Lewis, A., 1978. Perceptions of tax rates. British Tax Review, 358-66. 
 
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Rider, Mark, 1996. A revelation approach to 
optimal taxation. Public Finance Quarterly 24(2), 439-63. 
 
McCaffery, Edward J., Baron, Jonathan, 2004. Masking redistribution (or its 
absence.) Institute for Law and Economics, Research Paper No. 04-09, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
 
McCaffery, E. J., Slemrod, J., 2004. Toward an agenda for behavioral public 
finance. USC CLEO Research paper No. C04-22. 
 
McFadden, Daniel, 1984. Econometric analysis of qualitative response models. 
In: Griliches, Zvi and Intriligator, Michael (Eds.), Handbook of 
Econometrics, Vol. 2, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
 
Mirrlees, James A., 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income 
taxation. Review of Economic Studies 38, 175-208. 
 
Ramsey, Frank P., 1927, A contribution to the theory of taxation. Economic 
Journal 37(145), 47-61. 
 
Rawls, John, 1971. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
 
Roth, Alvin E., Parsnikar, Vesna, Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro, Zamir, Shmuel, 
1991. Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, 
and Tokyo: an experimental study. The American Economic Review 81(5), 
1068-1095. 
 
Sheffrin, Steven M., 1994. Perceptions of fairness in the crucible of tax policy. In:  
Slemrod, Joel (Ed.), Tax Progressivity and Income Inequality. Cambridge  
University Press, Cambridge. 
 
   
 
   34
APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
  The experimental instructions for Treatment 2 follow.  Changes in the 




This experiment is concerned with the economics of decision-making.  
The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good 
decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid to 
you in cash.   
 
In this experiment you will be given an endowment of cash.  This 
endowment is your income for participating in the experiment today except that 
you must pay a tax. 
 
A Record Sheet is included with these instructions.  You will keep track of 




  Your income, before taxes, is determined by drawing a card from a set of 
nine cards.  The incomes recorded on the nine cards are as follows: $10, $15, 
$20, $25, $30, $35, $40, $45, and $50.  Notice that because each income level is 
equally likely, the average income is $30 before taxes are paid.   
 
  The tax you pay on income will be one of two types.  With Tax 1, all 
participants in this room will pay a tax of $7.50.  With Tax 2, the tax paid varies 
across income levels.  The following table summarizes the tax that is paid for 
each income level. 
 
Tax 1  Tax 2  Pre-Tax 
Income  Tax  After-tax 
payoff  Tax  After-tax 
payoff 
$10.00 $7.50  $2.50  $0  $10.00 
$15.00  $7.50 $7.50 $2.00  $13.00 
$20.00 $7.50 $12.50 $3.00 $17.00 
$25.00 $7.50 $17.50 $4.00 $21.00 
$30.00 $7.50 $22.50 $7.50 $22.50 
$35.00  $7.50  $27.50 $11.00 $24.00 
$40.00  $7.50  $32.50 $12.00 $28.00 
$45.00  $7.50  $37.50 $13.00 $32.00 
$50.00  $7.50  $42.50 $15.00 $35.00 
 
[Note: The amount paid with Tax 2 varies in Treatments 3 and 4. The tax 
structures are reported in Table 2 of the paper.] 
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  Whether the tax you pay is Tax 1 or Tax 2 will be determined by majority 
vote.  After the experimenter distributes the income cards, you will be given 5 
minutes to indicate which tax you prefer.  When all participants have recorded 
their votes on their Record Sheets, the experimenter will tally the votes and 
report on the outcome.  Please record the tax paid and your after-tax payoff on 
your Record Sheet.  Your income is your private information and should not be 
disclosed to other participants at any time.   
  
[Note: In Treatment 1 income cards are distributed after votes are recorded.] 
 
We will repeat these steps 5 times.  At the end of each trial, the tax 
chosen by the majority vote is announced.  However, only one of the five trials 
will be binding.  A number from one to five will be randomly selected to determine 
the binding trial.  Your after-tax payoff from the binding trial is yours to keep and 
will be paid to you in cash. 
 
  Please do not confer with other participants in making your decisions at 
any time.  Please remember that once you record your vote in each trial, you 




Trial  Your vote 
(Tax 1 or Tax 2) 
Majority vote 
(Tax 1 or Tax 2)
Your pre-tax payoff 




















      
 
   
 
 